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ARTICLE

Bureaucracy and the U.S. Response to Mass Atrocity
Gregory Brazeal
ABSTRACT
The U.S. response to mass atrocity has followed a predictable pattern of
disbelief, rationalization, evasion, and retrospective expressions of regret. The
pattern is consistent enough that we should be skeptical of chalking up the
United States’ failures solely to a shifting array of isolated historical
contingencies, from post‐Vietnam fatigue in the case of the Khmer Rouge to the
Clinton administration’s recoil against humanitarian interventions after Somalia.
It is implausible to suggest that the United States would have acted to mitigate
or end mass atrocities but for the specific historical contingencies that happen to
accompany each outbreak of violence. This essay proposes a supplementary
explanation for the United States’ history of failed responses to mass atrocity.
The explanation is based on a widely accepted model of bureaucratic behavior,
according to which bureaucracies follow standardized routines, bureaucrats
operate according to a “logic of appropriateness” rather than a “logic of
consequence,” and seemingly irrational results often follow when a bureaucracy
is confronted with a problem for which it has no preset response. The essay
concludes by endorsing the recent recommendation by Madeleine Albright and
William Cohen of various bureaucratic reforms aimed at preventing genocide,
including the establishment of a permanent Atrocities Prevention Committee.



J.D., Harvard Law School, magna cum laude, June 2010.
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By the end of 1942, the U.S. government had adequate evidence to
conclude that a campaign to annihilate the Jews of Europe was well underway. 1
The State Department had received intelligence on Hitler’s order for a Final
Solution, a personal acquaintance of President Roosevelt had informed a press
conference that he and the State Department possessed reliable information
that some two million Jews had already been murdered, the Office of Strategic
Services had learned of the existence of the death camps, and a justice of the
Supreme Court, Felix Frankfurter, had personally heard the eye‐witness
testimony of an escapee from Belzec.2 In the following two years, public and
classified information on the extermination campaign continued to accumulate.3
Yet through the end of the war, with the limited exception of the creation of the
War Refugee Board in 1944, the United States took almost no actions directed
specifically toward saving the lives of European Jews.4
Two failures to act have drawn particular attention. First, the U.S.
government considered and decided not to bomb the Auschwitz extermination
camp out of commission, even as American heavy bombers staged several
attacks nearby.5 As a result, the assembly line of train tracks, crematoria and gas
chambers continued to function until the fall of 1944.6 Second, the U.S.
government refused to grant temporary refuge to Jews fleeing Europe.7 In the
wake of the Great Depression, the United States had an extremely restrictive
immigration quota system, but even the limited quota spots were not filled.8
How can the U.S. response to the Holocaust be explained? The question
has been a subject of thorough historical attention, and the most widely
accepted answers have usually involved some combination of latent or overt
anti‐Semitism and anti‐immigration sentiment among the American public and
its officials, an inability or unwillingness to understand the unprecedented
enormity of the crime taking place, and the difficulty of allocating attention and
1

See generally SAMANTHA POWER, “A PROBLEM FROM HELL”: AMERICA AND THE AGE OF
GENOCIDE 33–36 (Basic Books 2002) (discussing the information that the government had
on the Holocaust); DAVID M. KENNEDY, FREEDOM FROM FEAR: THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN
DEPRESSION AND WAR, 1929–1945, at 795–97 (1999) (identifying the evidence about the
Holocaust that was available to the U.S. government); DAVID S. WYMAN, THE
ABANDONMENT OF THE JEWS 19–41, 42–58 (1984) (capturing the historical context of the
Holocaust and the data that the U.S. received of its existence).
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 796.
6
WYMAN, supra note 1, at 288.
7
See id. at 6–9 (discussing the nation’s “limited willingness to share the refugee
burden”).
8
See id. at 136 (noting that 90 percent of the quotas went unused).
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resources in the midst of the struggle for military victory.9 Without denying the
validity of these contingent cultural and historical factors, however, their
acceptance would only give rise to another mystery. If U.S. inaction during the
Holocaust resulted primarily from anti‐Semitism or anti‐immigrant sentiment, or
from the unprecedented nature of the act, or from the competing demands of
wartime, how to explain the structurally similar inaction that the United States
has displayed in response to nearly every genocide since the Holocaust? No
evidence exists of anti‐Tutsi or anti‐Kurd sentiment, nor have Americans ever
feared a wave of Bosnian refugees, nor was the United States so overburdened
by wartime mobilization in 1994 that it lacked the ability to attend to the
Rwandan genocide.10
As Samantha Power persuasively shows in “A Problem from Hell” the U.S.
response to genocide follows an extremely predictable pattern of disbelief,
rationalization, evasion, and retrospective expressions of regret.11 Power
summarizes the pattern in a series of four bulleted points in the preface to her
book,12 then illustrates the pattern in detail over the course of chapters on the
U.S. response to mass atrocities in Cambodia, Iraq, Bosnia, Rwanda, and
elsewhere. The pattern has arguably been repeated since the publication of
Power’s book in the U.S. response to the mass atrocities in Darfur.13
A systemic failure of some kind seems to be at work. The failure is
predictable enough that we might be skeptical of attempts to chalk it up solely to
a shifting array of isolated historical contingencies in each case, from post‐
Vietnam fatigue in the case of the Khmer Rouge to the Clinton administration’s
recoil against humanitarian interventions after Somalia. It seems implausible to
suggest that the United States would have acted to mitigate or end the mass
atrocities described by Power but for the specific historical contingencies that
happened to accompany each outbreak of violence. To accept this explanation of
U.S. failure seems to require accepting a long string of parallel historical
coincidences, as though nearly every time a genocide has begun, it has just so
happened that another, unrelated, counterbalancing event has practically or
politically prevented the United States from adequately responding.

9

See infra notes 26, 35, 37, 38.
POWER, supra note 1, at xv–xvi.
11
Id. at xvii–xviii.
12
Id.
13
See Erin Patrick, Intent to Destroy: The Genocidal Impact of Forced Migration in
Darfur, Sudan, 18 J. REFUGEE STUD. 410, 422 (2005) (noting Bush administration’s
exceptional willingness to use term “genocide” in reference to Darfur, but “without any
corresponding change in action or policy”).
10
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A more plausible explanation would be that there is some set of
structural, long‐term defects largely driving the U.S. response to mass atrocity.
Even if the specific historical contingencies accompanying the genocides above
had been absent, or materially different, these structural defects would likely
still have prevented the U.S. from acting. In their retrospective expressions of
regret, outgoing government officials might simply have assigned blame to some
other passing contingency or exceptional breakdown in governmental
processes.14
The following essay attempts to apply Graham Allison’s and Philip
Zelikow’s three models of governmental action to the explanation of the U.S.
response to mass atrocities.15 In particular, the essay focuses on the often
neglected explanatory power of Model II, the Organizational Behavior Model.
The aim will be to follow Allison’s exhortation to move beyond “unique
explanations” of isolated U.S. governmental actions—in this case, U.S. responses
to mass atrocity—and toward “characterization of these phenomena at a more
general level.”16 In conclusion, the essay will propose structural reforms to
14

The remarkable similarity of expressions of regret by former U.S. Secretaries of State
contributes to the sense of a structural, rather than merely personal, failure:
[Rwanda] sits as the greatest regret that I have from the time I was U.N.
ambassador and maybe even as [S]ecretary of [S]tate, because it is a
huge tragedy, and something that sits very heavy on all our souls, I
think.
—Former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, February 25, 2004
You look at something like Darfur, and it just breaks your heart.
—Former U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, September 20, 2008
[O]ne of the real regrets I’ve had is that we haven’t been able to do
something about Sudan.
—Former U.S. Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, November 13, 2008
John Norris, Getting It Right: What the United States Can Do To Prevent Genocide and
Crimes Against Humanity in the Twenty‐First Century, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 417, 417
(2009).
15
Model I, the Rational Actor Model, conceives of the government as a centrally
controlled, completely informed, rationally maximizing actor. Model II, the
Organizational Behavior Model, focuses on the effects of the standardized procedures,
routines, and cultures of government bureaucracies. Model III, the Governmental
Politics Model, concentrates on bargaining among political actors within the
government, especially at high levels in the executive branch. GRAHAM ALLISON & PHILIP
ZELIKOW, ESSENCE OF DECISION 4–6 (2d ed. 1999). For convenience, I will refer to Allison
and Zelikow collectively as “Allison” in the text.
16
Id. at 389.
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address the structural problems that have so often led the United States to
respond inadequately to the occurrence of mass atrocities, to express remorse in
retrospect, and then to repeat its mistakes once again.
Allison’s Model II may be as relevant to understanding the U.S. response
to the Holocaust and subsequent genocides as it is to understanding America’s
failure to anticipate or prevent the attack on Pearl Harbor. If one relies entirely
on the Rational Actor Model to explain the latter failure, Allison notes, one may
feel driven toward an implausible explanation based on a conspiracy, possibly
involving President Roosevelt, or based on exceptional, widespread institutional
failure.17 Once one adopts Model II, however, the failure to predict the attack on
Pearl Harbor is relatively easily understood as a natural though not inevitable
result of the “relevant organizations . . . function[ing] in accordance with
established routines.”18
Similarly, if one relies on the Rational Actor Model to explain the U.S.
response to the Holocaust, one may have trouble fathoming how the U.S.
government could have valued thousands of Jewish lives less than the cost of a
bombing run, or how the United States could have preferred to see tens of
thousands of people die rather than granting them temporary safe harbor. One
may be tempted to turn to Model III and focus on the obstruction of key internal
governmental figures, such as Breckinridge Long, the notorious assistant
secretary in the State Department who blocked the issuing of visas to Jewish
refugees, repeatedly disrupted rescue efforts, and obscured his actions in
inaccurate testimony before Congress;19 or John McCloy, the assistant secretary
of war who made the decision not to bomb Auschwitz.20 One will search for the
morally responsible individuals in the government, those who decided that
Jewish lives were not worth saving.
But even when one has identified the individuals who appear to be
responsible, one may have trouble making sense of their actions. It was originally
assumed by many historians, for example, that Long must have been motivated
by anti‐Semitism, and various derogatory references in his writings were
produced as evidence.21 But a more recent study summarizes growing doubts
regarding Long’s anti‐Semitism and concludes: “Breckinridge Long can best be
17

Id. at 175.
Id. at 176.
19
See RICHARD BREITMAN & ALAN M. KRAUT, AMERICAN REFUGEE POLICY AND EUROPEAN JEWRY,
1933–1945, at 126–45 (1987) (discussing Breckinridge Long’s actions and policies
toward Jewish refugees).
20
KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 796.
21
See BREITMAN & KRAUT, supra note 19, at 126–27 (noting “Long’s reputation as an anti‐
Semite” and his “references to refugee advocates” in “phrases that ring of anti‐Semitic
feelings,” such as “‘Frankfurter’s boys’ or ‘New York liberals’”).
18
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understood against the backdrop of preexisting refugee policy and the cross
pressures to which he was subjected by virtue of his appointment. He was
conscious of State’s mandate to enforce America’s restrictive laws rigorously.”22
Long was a political appointee in the bureaucracy of the Department of State,
and he apparently took the actions he did at least in part as a result of the
pressures exerted upon him in his position.23 The bureaucracy had developed
capacities and routines for enforcing a highly restrictive immigration quota
system.24 The bureaucracy’s culture—its “organizational essence”25—was
shaped by widespread Congressional and public antipathy toward immigration in
the wake of the Great Depression.26 Bureaucrats might reasonably have
internalized a sense that the more strictly they enforced immigration laws, the
more their organization and they themselves would benefit.
Perhaps even more importantly, responding to the attempts of refugees
to flee a genocide fell far outside any “standard scenarios”27 that the
bureaucracy had prepared itself to address. There were no standard operating
procedures or routines for such a contingency.28 The word “genocide” did not
even exist in 1942.29 If Felix Frankfurter, Isaiah Berlin, and David Ben‐Gurion had
trouble coming to terms with the notion of a systematic program of racial
extermination,30 there seems little hope that an unprepared bureaucracy would
be able to respond rationally as an institution. Rather, Allison’s model suggests
that “[w]here situations cannot be construed as standard, organizations engage
in search,” which is “problem‐oriented: it focuses on the atypical discomfort that
must be avoided. It is simple‐minded: the neighborhood of the symptom is
searched first, then the neighborhood of the current alternative.”31 This seems
to have been more or less what Long’s bureaucracy did. Confronted with a
discomforting, non‐standard scenario—an unprecedented refugee crisis—it
22

Id. at 127.
Id. at 126–27.
24
Cf. id. at 28 (“Long opposed liberalization of America’s restrictive policies.”); WYMAN,
supra note 1, at 6 (noting that the nation’s small quota limits were established in the
1920s).
25
ALLISON & ZELIKOW, supra note 15, at 167.
26
See WYMAN, supra note 1, at 6–8.
27
ALLISON & ZELIKOW, supra note 15, at 171.
28
MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT & WILLIAM COHEN, PREVENTING GENOCIDE: A BLUEPRINT FOR U.S.
POLICYMAKERS 60 (2008), available at
http://media.usip.org/reports/genocide_taskforce_report.pdf (“[N]o single office or
interagency body in the U.S. government is responsible for thinking about or planning
how the United States might respond to warning of genocide or mass atrocities.”).
29
See POWER, supra note 1, at 40–46 (discussing Raphael Lemkin’s coining of the term
“genocide” in 1944).
30
See infra note 35.
31
ALLISON & ZELIKOW, supra note 15, at 171.
23
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assimilated the scenario to its ordinary procedures and clamped down even
further on the admission of refugees, refusing to fill 90% of the quota spots that
might have been available for European Jews.32 The catastrophic performance of
Long’s visa‐issuing bureaucracy may be seen as an almost predictable example of
what often happens in a bureaucracy when “new, unfamiliar tasks are
superimposed onto old routines.”33 Given the “gravitational pull”34 that existed
within the agency toward restricting immigration, it would probably have taken
extraordinary leadership to balance the continuation of the restrictive policy in
general with a special, expansive exception for Jewish refugees.
The same can be said of John McCloy’s bureaucracy in the Department of
War. Far from having responded to information about the extermination of the
Jews with indifference or contempt, McCloy’s response is eerily similar to that of
the Jewish, ardent Zionist Supreme Court justice Felix Frankfurter, or for that
matter the responses of Nahum Goldman, Chaim Weizmann, and David Ben‐
Gurion, all of whom seemed incapable of fully believing the reports they
received of the Final Solution.35 As late as December 1944, McCloy took aside an
official from the World Jewish Congress and asked: “We are alone. Tell me the
truth. Do you really believe that all those horrible things happened?” 36 An
imaginative and humane leader might have done more in McCloy’s position, just
as an imaginative and humane leader certainly would have done more in Long’s.
But in the end, McCloy’s bureaucracy, like Long’s, behaved more or less as it was
designed to do. The U.S. Army Air Forces had not been given the task of
disrupting the operation of the Third Reich’s network of extermination camps,
and such an action certainly lay outside any established standard operating
procedure, routine, or bureaucratic self‐conception.37 Organization theory would
predict precisely what happened: all other things being equal, the bombing
would not take place. The U.S. Army Air Forces bureaucracy continued to fulfill

32

America and the Holocaust: Breckinridge Long, PBS,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/holocaust/peopleevents/pandeAMEX90.html (last
visited Feb. 19, 2011) (“[T]he effect of the immigration policies set by Long’s
department was that, during American involvement in the war, 90 percent of the quota
places available to immigrants from countries under German and Italian control were
never filled. If they had been, an additional 190,000 people could have escaped the
atrocities being committed by the Nazis.”).
33
ALLISON & ZELIKOW, supra note 15, at 158.
34
Id. at 159.
35
See POWER, supra note 1, at 34; KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 796–97.
36
KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 796.
37
See id. (“The [World Refugee Board] . . . submitted a recommendation to Assistant
Secretary of War McCloy that the Auschwitz death camp should be bombed out of
commission, even if the bombs would kill some of the Jewish inmates. McCloy rejected
the idea.”).
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its organizational objective of pursuing military victory by destroying the
warmaking infrastructure of the Third Reich.38
It has been a commonplace, at least since Hannah Arendt’s Eichmann in
Jerusalem, that the evil of the Final Solution was in many ways a bureaucratic
phenomenon, the product of incongruously banal organizational behaviors.39
The genocide scholar Irving Horowitz has gone so far as to define genocide as “a
structural and systematic destruction of innocent people by a state bureaucratic
apparatus.”40 The mass atrocities in Darfur, if one calls them a genocide, may
provide a partial exception, in the sense that in Darfur, “there has never been a
stable, technocratic regime or a bureaucracy to plan, execute, and document an
orderly mass killing.”41 But even in the case of Darfur, the central government in
Khartoum used bureaucratic obstruction to interfere with relief efforts.42
Less attention has been paid to the important role of organizational
behavior in shaping international responses to genocide, as suggested in the
examples from the U.S. response to the Holocaust above. We tend to ascribe an
immoral “logic of consequences” to individual actors within the government, or
to the government as a whole, rather than explaining the government’s
cumulative behavior as at least in part the result of actors behaving according to
a “logic of appropriateness.”43 That is, we identify the figures who failed to act
and then attempt to make sense of their failures by assuming that they chose
the courses of action that best satisfied their underlying preferences, which we
then conclude must have been reprehensible. For whatever reasons, most of us
intuitively turn to such rational actor explanations rather than considering that
the relevant actors might not have been making rational, consequentialist
calculations at all, but might have been largely doing what seemed appropriate,
responding based on the standard routines at their disposal, just as we generally
expect and desire the members of a bureaucracy to do.
38

See id. (“McCloy may well have concluded that rescue through victory was more likely
than rescue through a singular action deep inside Poland.”).
39
See generally HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL
78–98 (1963).
40
IRVING LOUIS HOROWITZ, TAKING LIVES: GENOCIDE AND STATE POWER 23 (5th ed., 2002) (italics
removed). Cf., e.g., STEPHEN KINZER, A THOUSAND HILLS 138 (2008) (quoting a historian of
the Rwandan genocide: “There was little spontaneity in the whole process, apart from
some young street urchins joining in the bloody fun . . . . Everything went ahead with
the precision of a well‐rehearsed drill.”).
41
Mai‐Linh K. Hong, A Genocide By Any Other Name: Language, Law, and the Response
to Darfur, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 235, 262 (2008).
42
Jennifer Trahan, Why the Killing in Darfur Is Genocide, 31 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 990, 1048
(2008).
43
See ALLISON & ZELIKOW, supra note 15, at 146 (discussing the difference between a
logic of “consequences” and a logic of “appropriateness”).
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Though one frequently comes across brief references to bureaucratic
inertia in writings on the response to genocide,44 the only sustained study of the
response to genocide as a bureaucratic phenomenon appears to be Michael N.
Barnett’s Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda (2003).
Barnett, a political officer of the U.S. Mission to the UN at the time of the
genocide, describes how he and nearly all other insiders at the UN came to
oppose intervention in Rwanda, and thus why the UN did nothing.45 The best
explanation, he finds, requires looking to “how a bureaucratic culture shapes
individuals.”46 Though Barnett draws from Max Weber and Hannah Arendt
rather than more recent theorists of bureaucracy such as Allison and Morton
Halperin, his analysis shares the “new institutionalist” understanding of how
bureaucracies can function not only as neutral, more or less efficient tools for
achieving externally determined ends, but can powerfully shape those ends,
often in unpredictable or even irrational ways.47 In terms that echo Allison’s
discussion of the logic of appropriateness and the potential irrationality of
bureaucratic cultures, Barnett summarizes his findings:
The culture within the UN generated an understanding of the
organization’s unique contribution to world politics. It produced rules
that signaled when peacekeeping was “the right tool for the job.” It
contained orienting concepts such as neutrality, impartiality, and
consent, which governed how peacekeepers were supposed to operate
in the field . . . . In brief, those working at the UN approached Rwanda
not as individuals but rather as members of bureaucracies. They
occupied roles that organizationally situated and defined their
knowledge, and informed what they cared about, what behavior they
considered appropriate and inappropriate, how they distinguished
acceptable from unacceptable consequences, and how they determined
right from wrong. Something about the culture at the UN could make
nonintervention not merely pragmatic but also legitimate and proper—
even in the face of crimes against humanity.48

Barnett thus arrives at an extremely different picture of UN inaction
during the Rwandan genocide than the ordinary one reflected in, for example,
44

See, e.g., POWER, supra note 1, at xx (referring to the “intransigent bureaucracy” that
resisted bombing Serb ethnic cleansers in Bosnia).
45
MICHAEL N. BARNETT, EYEWITNESS TO A GENOCIDE: THE UNITED NATIONS AND RWANDA ix–xi
(2003).
46
Id. at xi.
47
Cf. ALLISON & ZELIKOW, supra note 15, at 153–58 (defining “new institutionalism” as
viewing organizations and bureaucrats as “more autonomous,” with the ability to define
critical tasks in order to cater to the preferences of both the organization and its
managers).
48
BARNETT, supra note 45, at xi.
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Stephen Kinzer’s A Thousand Hills. Ultimately, both Barnett and Kinzer recognize
the moral culpability of UN leaders such as Kofi Annan, then Director of the
Department of Peacekeeping Operations, and Secretary General Boutros
Boutros‐Ghali. But in Kinzer’s presentation, the callousness of figures like Annan,
Boutros‐Ghali and U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright (“[a]t every point as
the Rwanda crisis intensified, she worked diligently to keep the UN peacekeeping
force small and weak”49), seems inexplicable. Public servants who at other
moments in their careers have been recognized for their humanitarian
sympathies appear to perform diabolical calculations in which the risk to
thousands of Tutsi lives is simply shrugged off. But once we consider that an
organizational logic of appropriateness may have displaced to some extent the
calculation of moral consequences, the actions of Annan, Boutros‐Ghali, Albright
and others become more explicable, though not necessarily excusable. Albright
may have approached the unexpected problem placed before her not as an
individual but as a member—as the leader—of the State Department
bureaucracy, an organization that had no pre‐established routine (or generic
policy plan) for responding to genocide, that had never suffered in the past as an
organization for failing to respond to a genocide, and that possessed an
organizational essence focused on diplomacy, not military intervention.
Because organizational theory has so rarely played a role in explanations
of the U.S. response to mass atrocity, it may be worth pausing to consider some
of the alternative explanations. For example, Samantha Power, a protégé of
Allison’s and co‐editor with him of a book on the implementation of human
rights policy,50 cites the original edition of Essence of Decision in the bibliography
to “A Problem from Hell,” and is thus more than aware of Model II. But she
chooses not to give organizational theory a central place in her account of
America’s behavior in the age of genocide. Instead, Power concludes, in the
general spirit of Model III, that “[i]t is in the realm of domestic politics that the
battle to stop genocide is lost.”51 “No U.S. president,” Power writes, “has ever
made genocide prevention a priority, and no U.S. president has ever suffered
politically for his indifference to its occurrence. It is thus no coincidence that
genocide rages on.”52 Her historical narratives also locate significant explanatory
power in the U.S. national interest, in the spirit of Model I. For example, in
explaining America’s relatively exceptional early intervention in the ethnic
cleansing in Kosovo, Power notes that the operation “would probably not have
been launched without the perceived threat to more traditional U.S. interests,”

49

KINZER, supra note 40, at 118.
REALIZING HUMAN RIGHTS: MOVING FROM INSPIRATION TO IMPACT (Samantha Power &
Graham T. Allison eds., 2000).
51
POWER, supra note 1, at xviii.
52
Id. at xxi.
50
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in particular “the threat to American credibility” in the face of Milosevic’s brazen
defiance of U.S. demands.53
The vast majority of Power’s book, however, is dedicated to the stories of
brave, individual dissenters and advocates inside and outside of government,
from Raphael Lemkin, the father of the Genocide Convention and coiner of the
term “genocide,” to the young bureaucrats who resigned from the State
Department in protest over U.S. policy on Bosnia.54 Perhaps in order to inspire
readers to increase political pressure on the U.S. government to respond
forcefully to genocide—in line with her generally Model III‐type theory that
domestic politics controls humanitarian policy outcomes—Power places at the
center of her book a number of figures who, by the terms of her own model, did
not significantly determine the course of events.55
In a recent article, John Norris, the Executive Director of the Enough
Project, articulates the model of government behavior that seems to underlie
Power’s book:
How is it that the United States stood with its hands in its proverbial
pockets as such atrocities took place? Perhaps it is more important to
understand exactly how successive administrations have avoided
addressing genocide and war crimes than to focus solely on the
bureaucratic improvements that would make responses more effective.
There is no substitute for genuine political will coupled with an
educated public constituency that believes mass killings are
unacceptable.56

As Norris makes even clearer elsewhere in the article, his model of U.S.
governmental behavior in response to mass atrocities is a combination of Model
I, with a focus on centralized decisions made by the President, and Model III,
with a focus on internal debates among high‐level policy advisors, undertaken in
the context of domestic political pressures.57 He explicitly downplays the
importance of the bureaucratic structures emphasized by Model II.58
53

Id. at 448.
Id. at 313.
55
Cf. POWER, supra note 1, at xviii (“By seeing what [these figures] tried to get done, we
see what America could have done . . . . By seeing how and why they failed, we see what
we as a nation let happen.”).
56
See Norris, supra note 14, at 420.
57
See id. at 431 (echoing Model I: “Still, the hardest choice facing President Obama will
be deeply personal. Will he stake his reputation on an honest conversation with the
American public?”); see also id. (echoing Model III: “Political advisers will argue that
tough action would expend too much political capital, career staffers at the State
Department and Pentagon will sketch out nightmare scenarios of U.S. interventions
54
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It is not this essay’s goal to deny that Presidential leadership or domestic
political pressure could be sufficient to bring about an adequate American
response to mass atrocity. If domestic political pressure were strong enough, or
if the President took the initiative, there is no reason to believe that the
diplomatic, humanitarian and military bureaucracies would fail to serve as more
or less effective instruments—though their institutional structures would no
doubt shape the options considered and the information received by political
leaders. Power’s, Norris’, and many others’ efforts to raise awareness and
organize interest group pressure in favor of effective U.S. responses to mass
atrocities are of course to be applauded, and we can all only hope that they
succeed.
But what if such efforts do not succeed? And what if the President has no
overriding personal commitment? This is the possibility that makes the
consideration of Model II vital to understanding and improving the U.S. response
to mass atrocity. Governmental action against mass atrocities can be initiated
either by the President personally, or as a result of pressure on the President by
concerned senior advisors, or as a result of pressure on the White House by
concerned political interest groups and their representatives.59 When none of
these triggers are engaged, however, the responsibility for initiating any U.S.
response devolves to existing bureaucracies.60 In practice, State Department
bureaucrats appear to be the last resort for U.S. governmental action against
mass atrocities.61
The question is then: when all else fails, do we have appropriate
bureaucratic systems in place to provide a backstop against political failures to
take action against mass atrocities? The answer is clearly no.62 A bipartisan task
force on preventing genocide co‐chaired by former Secretary of State Madeleine
gone wrong, and legislators will contend that domestic policy should trump
international adventurism.”).
58
See id. at 420.
59
ALBRIGHT & COHEN, supra note 28, at 59.
60
Id.
61
See id. (“This mechanism for crisis management, however, has rarely been used to
consider threats of genocide or mass atrocities.”).
62
Nor is there an adequate, permanent international bureaucracy to address the
specific threat of genocide. See Cherif Bassiouni, Remarks, Genocide: The Convention,
Domestic Laws, and State Responsibility, 83 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 314, 315 (1989)
(“[T]he Genocide Convention, unlike others, has not created an international
bureaucracy . . . . The ILO, or the International Committee of the Red Cross, or the
several bodies dealing with narcotics, are all bureaucracies that have an interest in
perpetuating their existence; they always find opportunities for the development of new
and improved international instruments.”).
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Albright and former Defense Secretary William Cohen reached the same
conclusion in a report released in 2008.63 It is with some of this report’s
recommendations that I will conclude, because they capture extremely well the
kind of reforms that attention to Model II would suggest.
Albright and Cohen recognize, like Power, that there are specific steps
that should be taken, at minimum, whenever the U.S. government becomes
aware of a risk of genocide, and that there are a wide range of options beyond
these minimal steps that do not require military intervention.64 But whereas
Power puts her emphasis almost exclusively on developing public pressure and
political will for these actions,65 Albright and Cohen recognize a role for
permanent bureaucratic structures as a failsafe in case of political failure, and as
a spur to political reconsideration where it has fallen short.66
The first major finding of their report recognizes that in the past, the
degree of success in U.S. responses to genocide has been determined by
“[i]nterest and attention from the highest ranks of the U.S. government,” but
that this is “extremely difficult to mobilize and sustain.”67 Given the
inconsistency and unreliability of high‐level political commitment, the report’s
second major finding emphasizes the importance of establishing “an overarching
policy framework, a standing interagency process for devising and implementing
preventive strategies, and significant dedicated institutional capacity.”68 In other
words, they propose the bureaucratic entrenchment of mechanisms for
responding to genocide even when political will does not materialize in sufficient
quantities to generate an effective response.
This essay will not rehearse the details of Albright’s and Cohen’s
proposal, but it features specific devices that aim to avoid the moral hazard
created by past bureaucratic activity, “which permitted an illusion of continual
deliberation, complex activity, and intense concern,” while accomplishing little
or nothing in fact.69 Albright and Cohen explicitly recognize the weaknesses of
existing bureaucratic structures tasked with preventing mass atrocities, such as
63

See ALBRIGHT & COHEN, supra note 28, at 3 (noting the lack of bureaucratic mechanisms
for genocide prevention and response).
64
See POWER, supra note 1, at 514 (listing things that “the United States should do . . . in
every case” and other steps on a spectrum ending with military intervention).
65
See id. at 509 (asserting that, because of a lack of political and public pressure, “[t]he
battle to stop genocide . . . has been repeatedly lost in the realm of domestic politics”).
66
See ALBRIGHT & COHEN, supra note 28, at 3 (discussing the problems of “bureaucratic
indifference,” “political obstacles,” a lack of “reliable, long‐standing institutional
structures,” and failure to “draw lessons from both success and failure”).
67
ALBRIGHT & COHEN, supra note 28, at 1.
68
Id. at 3.
69
POWER, supra note 1, at 508.
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the State Department Office of War Crimes Issues, established by Albright in
1997 but now working almost exclusively on war crimes tribunal issues, and the
State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization,
which “has suffered from funding shortfalls, a relatively weak standing within the
State Department (to say nothing of the larger U.S. bureaucracy), and
uncertainties about its long‐term future.”70
In particular, Albright and Cohen propose the establishment of a new,
interagency Atrocities Prevention Committee (APC) and offer recommendations
for how it can be structured to avoid bureaucratic ineffectiveness:
The APC’s work would be supported and coordinated by a newly
created NSC directorate for crisis prevention and response. This
directorate would . . . direct and coordinate U.S. government action
across a broad range of instability and humanitarian emergencies, not
solely genocide and mass atrocities. Situating the APC in this context
would give the committee dedicated, specialized capacity while
integrating its work into mainstream priorities.
The temptation when addressing specific concerns is to create a specific
set of responses, such as a special coordinator with a single, stand‐alone
office. However, as similar initiatives have demonstrated, the end result
is typically bureaucratic marginalization if not outright irrelevance. By
embedding genocide prevention initiatives into a larger functional
imperative—namely, crisis prevention and response—the likelihood
that the United States would be prepared, able, and, moreover, willing
to respond in the future would be significantly enhanced.71

Albright and Cohen also recognize the importance of “effective
organization within the State Department . . . given how deeply State is involved
in virtually all U.S. efforts to prevent genocide and mass atrocities.” 72 Their
recommendation here is equally attuned to the risk of bureaucratic
marginalization:
We recommend that the secretary [of State] designate the assistant
secretary for democracy, human rights, and labor as the single point of
responsibility for coordinating genocide prevention efforts with others
in the department, particularly the regional bureaus. Genocide is,
fundamentally, a human rights issue, and DRL’s broad mandate should
help the assistant secretary mobilize preventive actions at an early
stage, long before mass atrocities are imminent. To be effective as a
70
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senior point person for State, the assistant secretary must command
respect throughout the department and abroad, with demonstrable
ability to take policy disputes directly to the secretary. The staff and
resources of DRL should be supplemented to match the additional
responsibilities of coordination within State and outreach abroad to
mobilize support for preventive action. Together with the NSC director
for crisis prevention and response—or an equivalent senior NSC official,
if that position is not created—the assistant secretary should co‐chair
the APC.73

Surveying the literature on the U.S. response to mass atrocity, a pattern
emerges. The greater an individual’s exposure to government bureaucracy, the
more importance the individual seems to place in organizational theory as a
factor in explaining the failed U.S. responses to genocide. Albright, Cohen and
the other members of their task force, nearly all former executive officials or
legislators, place a great deal of emphasis on bureaucratic structures, as does
Barnett, the former bureaucrat. Those affiliated with NGOs and academia tend
to downplay the importance of organizational behavior.74 There is no need for
this pattern to continue. It is possible to accept both that the most forceful U.S.
responses to mass atrocity will have to come from public activism and political
leadership, and that there is an important role to be played by bureaucratic
structures as a failsafe or catalyst for generating political action. Albright’s and
Cohen’s recommendations have not yet received the attention they deserve.75
Perhaps with greater support from the non‐governmental human rights
community, their proposals for bureaucratic reform in particular could be
realized before the United States finds itself expressing regret for its failure to
act once again.
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Senior Director for Multilateral Affairs and Human Rights at the National Security
Council in the White House, it will be interesting to see whether any change emerges in
her previously skeptical view of the potential for U.S. bureaucracies to play a significant
role in the response to mass atrocity.
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